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Abstract
We study the e⁄ects of the progressive elimination of the system of industrial
regulations on entry and production, known as the ￿license raj￿ , on registered man-
ufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with
di⁄erent labor market regulations. The e⁄ects are found to be unequal depending
on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular,
following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market
institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments.
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11 Introduction
In the post-war period, planned industrialization became a major doctrine for tackling
economic backwardness in developing countries. The theoretical argument was that
massive state investment would help kick start development and state coordination of
economic activities would ensure the rapid and sustained growth of domestic industries
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943 and 1961; Rostow, 1952). Policy-makers translated these prin-
ciples into a variety of policies. In countries where private initiative was not altogether
suppressed, a cornerstone of the development strategy was the requirement for ￿rms to
obtain a license to begin or expand production. The goal of this policy was to place
industrial development under the control of central governments, allowing them to al-
locate plan targets to ￿rms and to address inequities across regions. Trade restrictions
were also part of the same package: tari⁄s would shelter nascent domestic industries
from foreign competition, and help promote the industrialization process according to
the objectives of the plan.
These views remained in￿ uential among policy-makers until the 1970￿ s. However,
amidst growing dissatisfaction about its results, the consensus shifted in the 1980s from
planned industrialization to liberalization and laissez-faire. Many developing countries
progressively abandoned central planning, dismantled government controls over indus-
try, and liberalized trade. This paradigm change has been the source of a passionate
debate. Most mainstream economists have welcomed it as a key step to achieve growth
and poverty eradication, while skeptics have warned, among other things, that liberal-
ization might exacerbate income inequality within countries.1 In recent research, Ace-
moglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) argue that industrial policy and reforms need to
be ￿appropriate￿to other elements of the economic environment, such as the state of
technology and the organization of credit and labor markets. The interaction between
competition-enhancing policies and other institutions is, in their view, a key element to
design economic reforms and assess their e⁄ects.
In this paper we take a step in this direction. We focus on India, and look at
the e⁄ects of a particular internal liberalization episode ￿the dismantling of industrial
licensing during the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s. We exploit the fact that Indian states have a
considerable degree of political and policy autonomy, resulting in a large variation of
institutional environments with which the nationwide industrial policy reform interacts.
In particular, we focus on di⁄erences in labor market institutions.
After independence, India￿ s industrial policy had been shaped by the 1951 Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act which introduced a system of industrial licensing that
regulated and restricted entry of new ￿rms and expansion of existing ones and became
known as the ￿license raj￿ . The persistent stagnation of the Indian economy prompted
the government to undertake a set of liberalization reforms as of the 1980￿ s. About a
third of three-digit industries were exempted from industrial licensing, or delicensed,
in March 1985 (with few extensions in 1986 and 1987), whereas most of the remaining
1Among the critical views, see Haussman and Rodrik (2002), Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000), Stiglitz
(2002), and Rodrik et al., (2004). The e⁄ects on income inequality are stressed by Banerjee and Newman
(2003), and Attanasio et al. (2005). Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) provide a summary of the empirical
evidence on the e⁄ects of liberalization on inequality.
2industries were delicensed in 1991. Trade barriers (tari⁄s) were also slashed in the
1990￿ s. Labor market institutions also started from a common nationwide framework,
the Industrial Disputes Act, approved in 1947, which regulated industrial relations in
the organized manufacturing sector. However, under the Indian constitution states were
entitled to amend the Act, and amendments were in fact extensively introduced. As
a result, labor market institutions gradually evolved, and there was a large extent of
heterogeneity across Indian states at the time of the industrial policy reforms of the
1980￿ s and 1990￿ s.
To guide the analysis, we construct a simple model of an economy where ￿rms are
heterogenous in productivity as in Melitz (2003), but with subregions (or states) which
di⁄er in terms of their labor market institutions. We analyze how the removal of entry
or size restrictions induces entry, exit, and production reallocations between states with
di⁄erent labor market institutions. The theory predicts that a reform slashing barriers
to entry and regulations on ￿rms￿production activity would bene￿t states where labor
market institutions are more business-friendly, and possibly harm states there are biased
in favor of workers.
Then, we move to the empirical analysis. We track manufacturing industries using a
three-digit state-industry panel for the sixteen main states of India (covering over 95%
of the Indian population). We use panel data from the Annual Survey of Industries
covering the period 1980-1997 which spans the main period of delicensing in India.
For each of these years we have state-speci￿c industrial outcomes for an average of 85
three-digit industries in each year yielding about twenty-four thousand observations.
We have also information on the year in which the delicensing reform was introduced in
each industry. To measure state-speci￿c labor market regulations, we extend the data
of Besley and Burgess (2004) who coded state amendments Industrial Disputes Act
as ￿pro-employer￿ , ￿pro-worker￿ and ￿neutral￿ . State-industries within a three-digit
sector are heterogeneous in terms of the state regulatory environments in which they are
embedded. Both state labor regulations and the nationwide delicensing reforms apply to
the organized manufacturing sector surveyed by the Annual Survey of Industries allowing
us to make inferences about the interaction between product market and labor market
regulation.
Our main ￿nding is that, consistent with the prediction of the theory, the response
to delicensing varies signi￿cantly depending on the labor markets conditions prevailing
in di⁄erent Indian states. Within each industry, pro-employer states bene￿tted from the
reform relative to pro-worker states in terms of output, employment, capital accumula-
tion and the number of factories. In pro-worker states we ￿nd that delicensing actually
depressed industrial performance relative to what would have happened had the license
raj remained in place. Our results stand up to a wide variety of robustness checks. We
￿nd a similar interaction e⁄ect between labor market institutions and a measure of the
extent of the trade liberalization that was mainly carried out in the early 1990￿ s.
In previous work we have documented descriptively that the process of reform in
the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s was associated with increasing cross-state inequality in industrial
performance (Aghion et al.. 2005b). There, we showed that the timing and the variation
across industries of the inequality trends is associated with the process of delicensing. In
3particular, inequality started growing earlier for industries that delicensed in 1985, while
it only grew later for industries that delicensed in 1991, and does not grow for industries
that never delicensed. The results of this paper emphasize that institutional di⁄erences
across states are an important factor in the unequal response of state-industries, and
illustrate the importance of the interaction between fast-moving product market dereg-
ulation (delicensing, trade liberalization) and slow-moving labor market regulation in
explaining the evolution of cross-state industrial performance.2
Our work on the interaction between product and labor market regulation relates
to several strands of literature. First, a number of recent papers have focused on the
role of labor and entry regulation as a determinant of economic performance (Holmes,
1998; Caballero and Hammour, 1998; Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002; Djankov et al,
2002; Besley and Burgess, 2004; Caballero et al, 2004). Another set of papers argue
that the e⁄ectiveness and desirability of pro-competitive reforms depends on the state
of technology. These include Acemoglu et al. 2006, Aghion et al. (2004 and 2005a
and 2005b) and Aghion and Gri¢ th (2005). Aghion et al (2005a), in particular, show
using a UK ￿rm-level panel data, that innovation incentives respond more positively
to increased market competition in industries that are closer to the technology frontier
than in industries that are far below it. In a similar spirit the recent trade literature has
studied how heterogeneous ￿rms and industries react di⁄erently to trade liberalization
(Tybout et al., 1991; Hay, 2001, Krishna and Mitra, 1998, Levinsohn, 1999, Pavcnik,
2002; Melitz, 2003, Muendler, 2004, Tre￿ er, 2005 and Verhoogen 2005). Finally the
paper relates to a small but growing recent literature that analyzes the interaction
between product market and labor market regulations (Rama, 1997, and Rama and
Tabellini, 1999; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002, Cunat and Melitz, 2005; Harrison, 2005,
Topalova, 2005).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports on the history of the license raj
in India. Section 3 presents a simple model of industry equilibrium. Section 4 provides
a description of the data. Section 5 contains the main econometric analysis. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 The Rise and Fall of the License Raj
After independence in 1947 India embarked on a period of centrally planned industrial-
ization. The centerpiece of the planning regime was the Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act of 1951 which states that ￿it is expedient in the public interest that
the Union should take under its control the industries in First Schedule￿ .3 This Act
introduced a system of industrial licensing to control the pace and pattern of industrial
development across the country which became known as the ￿ license raj￿ . Licensing be-
came the key means of allocating production targets set out in the ￿ve-year plans to
2The distinction between fast moving and slowmoving institutions is discussed in Roland (1994),
who, however, refers to social norms and values as slow-moving institutions.
3Union refers to central government. The First Schedule lists all key manufacturing industries in
1951 and is subsequently revised to encompass new products. This central planning act e⁄ectively
brings all key industries in the organised manufacturing sector under central government control via
licensing (Malik, 1997).
4￿rms. Both state and private ￿rms in the registered manufacturing sector were covered
under the licensing regime (Hazari, 1966). State control over industrial development
via licensing was intended to accelerate industrialization and economic growth and to
reduce regional disparities in income and wealth.4
The development of the organized manufacturing sector became tightly regulated.
Under the 1951 Industries Act an industrial license was required to (i) establish a new
factory, (ii) carry on business in an existing unlicensed factory (iii) signi￿cantly expand
an existing factory￿ s capacity, (iv) start a new product line and (iv) change location.
Applications for industrial licenses were made to the Ministry of Industrial Development
and then reviewed by an inter-ministerial Licensing Committee.
The bureaucratic nature of the licensing process imposed a substantial administrative
burden on ￿rms.5 There was also considerable uncertainty as to whether license appli-
cations would be approved and within what time frame. For example, 35% of license
applications in 1959 and 1960 were rejected, with the rejected applicants accounting for
around 50% of the investment value of all applications (Hazari, 1966).6 Delays in the
approval process were common and of indeterminate length. No explicit criteria for the
award of industrial licenses were provided to applicants. Since the Licensing Commit-
tee reviewed applications on a sequential, ￿rst-come, ￿rst-served basis, and since the
￿ve-year plans laid down targets or ceilings for industrial capacity, this provided an
incentive for preemptive license applications. This system tended to favor the larger
industrial houses (e.g. Birla, J.K. and Tata) which were better informed and organized
and submitted multiple early applications as a means of foreclosing on plan capacity.
Recognition of these problems led to various reforms in the 1970s which attempted
to streamline the application process, raise exemption and expansion limits and to ex-
empt speci￿c product lines from the provisions of the 1951 Industries Act. By this time
it had become apparent that industrial licensing had failed to bring about the rapid
industrial development that had been anticipated in the 1950s. Wholesale reform of
the licensing system, however, was delayed until the 1980s. The Congress Party which
had been the dominant political force in the country su⁄ered a severe defeat in both,
state and central elections in the late 1970s. The heightened political competition which
followed led to pressure for dismantling of government controls including the industrial
licensing system. The Congress leader Indira Gandhi responded via the 1980 State-
ment on Industrial Policy which signalled a renewed emphasis on economic growth (see
Government of India, 1980). Large scale delicensing, however did not occur until her
4Other objectives included the development of small-scale and cottage industries and preventing con-
centration of economic power in the hands of small numbers of individuals (Industrial Policy Resolution,
1956).
5Successful license applicants were required to submit a G-return to the Ministry of Industrial Devel-
opment every six months outlining progress in implementing licensed capacity. Even once a license had
been granted, further expansion of capacity, changes in the article produced or changes in the location
of manufacture would require an additional license application under the terms of the 1951 Industries
Act.
6License applications are themselves a selected sample of potential undertakings. Some investments
that would have incurred in the absence of industrial licensing may not have even reached the license
application stage.
5son Rajiv Gandhi unexpectedly came to power following his mother￿ s assassination in
1984. He was an unknown quantity ￿an airline pilot with no political experience ￿who
turned out be a fervent reformer and was responsible for moving India in a pro-business
direction (Rodrik and Subramaniam, 2004). Twenty ￿ve broad categories of industries
were entirely exempted from industrial licensing, or delicensed, in March 1985. In late
1985 and 1986, there followed further relaxations of the industrial licensing system.
In May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in the midst of an election campaign
that subsequently carried his Congress Party to victory. Narasimha Rao was appointed
as his successor in the post of Prime Minister, and he in turn appointed Manmohan Singh
as Finance Minister. Rising external debt, exacerbated by the increase in oil prices due
to the Gulf War, resulted in macroeconomic crisis and India was obliged to request
a stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ￿nancial
assistance was made conditional upon the implementation of a structural adjustment
programme.
In response to this external pressure the Rao administration implemented a large
scale liberalization of the Indian economy. As with Rajiv Gandhi the depth of reformist
tendencies of the Rao/Singh team were largely unanticipated (Rodrik and Subrama-
niam, 2004; Topalova, 2005). In 1991 industrial licensing was abolished except for a
small number of industries where licensing was retained ￿for reasons related to security
and strategic concerns, social reasons, problems related to safety and over-riding en-
vironmental issues, manufacture of products of hazardous nature and articles of elitist
consumption.￿ (Government of India, 1991). Additional industries were removed from
the provisions of the 1951 Industries in the post-1991 period. From 1991 onwards, tari⁄
and non-tari⁄ barriers were also slashed as India opened its economy to the outside
world (Topalova 2004, 2005). The stated rationale for the liberalization of industrial
policy was ￿to actively encourage and assist Indian entrepreneurs to exploit and meet
the emerging domestic and global opportunities and challenges. The bedrock of any
package of measures must be to let the entrepreneurs make investment decisions on the
basis of their own commercial judgment.￿ (Government of India, 1991).
The two waves of delicensing in 1985 and 1991 brought central government control
over industrial development to a close. The license raj which had been in place for forty
years had collapsed. Both waves of reform followed leadership transitions resulting from
assassinations. In this paper we exploit this variation to examine whether the impact of
delicensing on industrial performance was a⁄ected by the state of labor institutions in
the Indian states.
3 A Simple Model of Industry Equilibrium
To guide the empirical analysis of the following sections, we construct a stylized model of
industry equilibrium where the reduction of barriers to entry and of regulation to produc-
tive activity generates entry, exit and resource reallocation between regions (￿states￿ )
characterized by di⁄erent labor market institutions. Its building blocks are the following.
First, ￿rms are heterogenous in productivity and geographical locations. Productivity
di⁄erences may stem from entrepreneurial skills, availability of local infrastructure, or
knowledge embodied in the local labor force. Second, ￿rms face common labor market
6institutions within each state but institutions vary across states. We capture such dif-
ferences in a reduced-form fashion by cross-state variation in average unit labor costs:
in states with pro-worker (pro-employer) labor markets institutions ￿rms have to pay
a higher (lower) wage to otherwise identical workers.7 Third, ￿rms are subject to en-
try costs (licence fees) or to regulations constraining their productive capacity. These,
combined with the existence of credit constraints, limit the number and size of ￿rms in
equilibrium. Delicensing is modeled as slashing license fees and removing regulations on
￿rm size.
More formally, we assume that ￿rms are located in two di⁄erent states, A and B,
assumed to be of equal economic size. Neither ￿rms nor workers are mobile across states,
while there is a unique nationwide product market.8 Firms use homogenous labor as
their only input, but they di⁄er in their unit labor costs: ￿good￿￿rms have low unit
cost. Labor productivities are drawn from a uniform density function with support,
￿ 2 [0;1]:
3.1 Removing Entry Barriers
In the ￿rst part of the analysis, we assume that each active ￿rm produces one unit of
output, while in the second part we allow for endogenous production levels. Firms face
a barrier represented by a licence fee b to be paid up front before starting production.
Because of credit market imperfections, ￿rms cannot borrow to pay for the licence, nor
can they use future pro￿ts as collateral. Thus, entrepreneurs (￿rms) must cover its
cost out of their wealth. Wealth, denoted by ! is uniformly distributed across ￿rms
in the interval [0;￿ b], and is assumed to be independent of productivity. In particular,
￿(!) = ￿0 ￿ ￿ b￿1; for all ! 2 [0;￿ b]: Given these assumptions, a proportion b=￿ b of ￿rms
at any productivity level is credit constrained and cannot enter irrespective of their
potential pro￿tability.
Consider ￿rms which are unconstrained (! > ￿ b). The pro￿t of ￿rm i located in state
s 2 fA;Bg is given by
￿is = p ￿
ws
￿is
￿ b (1)
where ws denotes unit labor costs. A ￿rm enters if ￿is > 0; i.e., if ￿is ￿ ￿0 ￿ ws=(p ￿ b):
We assume that ￿0 < 1, implying that in both states some but not all ￿rms want to
enter. Production in state s 2 fA;Bg is
Ss (p;b;ws) =
￿
1 ￿
ws
p ￿ b
￿￿
1 ￿
b
￿ b
￿
: (2)
Total supply equals then SA (p;b;wA) + SB (p;b;wB): The industry equilibrium re-
7Higher labor costs is a catch-all for a variety of regulations to the use of labor that can include
￿ exibility, minimum wages dismissal law, working time conditions etc.. Modelling explicitly labor
market institutions is beyond the scope of the stylized model presented in this section.
8Measured factor mobility across Indian states are low (see, for example, Topalova, 2005). As
discussed in the trade literature, factor mobility is important in determining the incidence of policy
reforms (see for example Neary 1978 and Banerjee and Newman 2003).
7quires then:
D(p) =
￿
1 ￿
b
￿ b
￿￿
2 ￿
wA + wB
p ￿ b
￿
where D(p) is the aggregate industry demand. We assume throughout that D0 (p) ￿ 0:
We now analyze the e⁄ect of delicensing, i.e., moving from b > 0 to b = 0. We assume
labor market institutions to be more pro-worker in state A than in state B, implying that
wA > wB. We denote by ￿Ss the post-reform output change in state s 2 fA;Bg, and
by p0 the post-reform equilibrium price. The following Proposition summarizes results
in the case with barriers to entry and ￿xed production at the ￿rm level.
Proposition 1 Assume wA > wB and b < ￿ b (barriers to entry are binding for some
￿rms in both states before the reform). Then, delicensing induces production reallocation
from state A to state B, namely, ￿SB > ￿SA: Moreover, if the demand is su¢ ciently
inelastic, then ￿SB > 0 and ￿SA < 0:
Proof of Proposition 1 (a) First, from (2) we immediately get:
￿SB ￿ ￿SA = (wA ￿ wB)
￿
1
p ￿ b
(1 +
b
b
) ￿
1
p0
￿
: (3)
Next, let p0 = p0
L denote the post-equilibrium price in case of a totally inelastic demand,
D(p) ￿ D; calculated by setting ￿SB + ￿SA = 0: This yields:
p
0
L =
￿
1
p ￿ b
￿
1 +
b
b
￿
￿
b
b
￿
2
wA + wB
￿￿￿1
:
Now, substituting for p0 = p0
L into (3) gives:
￿SB ￿ ￿SAjD(p)=D = 2
wA ￿ wB
wA + wB
b
b
> 0:
Clearly, if ￿SB ￿ ￿SAjD(p)=D > 0; then, a fortiori, ￿SB ￿ ￿SA > 0 holds in general,
since (as D0(p) < 0) p0 ￿ p0
L:
(b) In the limit case where demand is totally inelastic, with D(p) ￿ D; we have
￿SB + ￿SA = 0:
This, together with
￿SB ￿ ￿SA > 0
immediately implies that ￿SB > 0 and ￿SA < 0; establishing the proposition. QED
The liberalization reform causes high-productivity ￿rms which were previously credit-
constrained to enter in both states, but more so in B where labor costs are lower. The
entry of these ￿rms works as an aggregate supply shock causing a movement along the
downward-sloped demand curve. Thus, the equilibrium price falls, and this, in turn,
triggers the exit of less productive incumbents. Although there is exit in both states,
the entry ￿ ow of high-productivity ￿rms is larger in B. This results in the number of
￿rms and output rising in B relative to A, and possibly falling in A if the demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic.
83.2 Allowing Firms to Expand Capacity
An important aspect of the Indian delicensing reform is the elimination of costs and
barriers to the expansion of productive capacity in existing ￿rms. In order for the
theory to generate predictions on the e⁄ects of this aspect, we shall now expand the
model to allow for variable production at the ￿rm level. In particular, let ￿rms face the
following production function:
y = x
￿;
where x denotes the e⁄ective units of labor hired, and ￿ < 1. Decreasing returns
to x re￿ ect the presence of ￿xed factors of production (e.g., managerial ability). For
simplicity, we abstract here from barriers to entry (b = 0). As before, ￿good￿￿rms
have lower unit labor costs, namely, they need fewer workers to attain a given number of
e⁄ective units of labor. If unconstrained, ￿rms would set their optimal production level
such that the marginal product of labor equals the unit labor cost, i.e., ￿x￿￿1 = w=(p￿);
or, identically,
y =
￿
￿p￿
w
￿ ￿
1￿￿
:
However, prior to delicensing, prohibitive barriers prevent ￿rms from expanding pro-
duction above the level ￿ y: Since, absent constraints, more productive ￿rms would pro-
duce more output, this ceiling is binding for high-productivity ￿rms but not for low-
productivity ones. As before, we assume that wA > wB. Prior to delicensing, production
in State s 2 fA;Bg equals:
Ss (p; ￿ y;w) =
Z ~ ￿s
0
￿
￿p￿
ws
￿ ￿
1￿￿
d￿ +
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿s
￿
￿ y =
￿
1 ￿ ￿~ ￿s
￿
￿ y; (4)
where9
~ ￿s = min
￿
ws
￿p
￿ y
1￿￿
￿ ;1
￿
(5)
is the threshold productivity level such that the production ceiling is binding for all
￿rms with ￿ > ~ ￿s. We assume that prior to reform the ceiling ￿ y is binding for a positive
measure of ￿rms in both states, namely, ~ ￿B < ~ ￿A < 1:
Delicensing eliminates the ceiling ￿ y, causing an expansion of output in more produc-
tive ￿rms. After-reform production is captured in the model by letting ￿ y ! 1 and,
consequently, ~ ￿s = 1 in (4)-(5): Standard algebra (using the de￿nition of ~ ￿s) shows that
Ss (p
0;1;w) =
Z 1
0
￿
￿p0￿
ws
￿ ￿
1￿￿
d￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
p0
p
￿ ￿
1￿￿
~ ￿
￿ ￿
1￿￿
s ￿ y:
9The second equality is obtained by noting that, using repeteadly the de￿nition of ~ ￿c:
Z ~ ￿c
0
￿
￿p￿
wc
￿ ￿
1￿￿
d￿ +
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿c
￿
￿ y =
￿
￿p
wc
￿ ￿
1￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)~ ￿
1
1￿￿
c +
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿c
￿
￿ y
= (1 ￿ ￿)
wc
￿p
￿ y
1
￿ +
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿c
￿
￿ y =
￿
1 ￿ ￿~ ￿c
￿
￿ y
9As above, let ￿Ss denote the output change, namely, ￿Ss ￿ Ss (p0;1;w)￿Ss (p0; ￿ y;w)
The following Proposition can be established.
Proposition 2 Assume wA > wB and ~ ￿A < 1 (production ceilings are binding for some
￿rms in both states before the reform). Then, the elimination of barriers to production
induces production reallocation from state A to state B, namely, ￿SB > ￿SA. Moreover,
if the demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, then ￿SB > 0 and ￿SA < 0:
Proof of Proposition 2 First, note that for s 2 fA;Bg;
￿Ss = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿p0
ws
￿ ￿
1￿￿
￿
￿
￿ y ￿
ws
p
￿ y
1
￿
￿
:
Let ￿ ￿ wB=wA; so that ￿ 2 (0;1): Then:
￿SB ￿ ￿SA = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿p0
wA
￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
(6)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ y
1
￿ wA
p
:
In the inelastic demand case where ￿SB + ￿SA = 0; we have
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿p0
L
wA
￿ ￿
1￿￿
=
2y ￿ (￿ + 1)￿ y
1
￿ wA
p
￿
￿ ￿
1￿￿ + 1
: (7)
Next, replacing p0 in (6) by the expression of p0
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: The inequality (9) follows from the de￿n-
ition of ~ ￿A given in (5), from the assumption that ~ ￿A < 1; implying that ￿ y
1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿p=wA;
and from the fact that, since ￿
￿ ￿
1￿￿ > ￿; the right hand-side of (8) is decreasing
in ￿ y
1￿￿
￿ . The inequality (10) follows from the fact that, in the range ￿ 2 (0;1);
￿0 (￿) < 0; and from the fact that ￿0 (1) = 0 (thus, ￿(￿) > 0 in the relevant range).
Finally, since p0 ￿ p0
L; by (6), ￿SB ￿ ￿SAjD(p)=D is a lower bound to ￿SB ￿ ￿SA:
￿SB ￿ ￿SAjD(p)=D > 0 implies therefore that ￿SB > ￿SA for any demand elasticity,
establishing the ￿rst part of the proposition. The second part of the proposition follows
from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.QED
10Slashing production ceilings causes an expansion in the production of high-productivity
￿rms which were previously constrained, and a fall in the equilibrium price. Low-
productivity ￿rms react by reducing their output (if production were subject to ￿xed
costs, some would actually exit). On average, production expands more in state B (due
to lower labor costs), and possibly falls in state A.
In reality, the Indian reforms entailed both the reduction of barriers to entry and the
elimination of controls on the production decisions of ￿rms. Thus, our theory predicts
that the delicensing triggers both the entry of new ￿rms accompanied by the exit of less
productive incumbents (as in Proposition 1) and the expansion of more productive ￿rms
accompanied by the contraction of less productive ones (as in Proposition 2). Both
e⁄ects give rise to a reallocation of economic activity. Within each industry, output,
employment, the number of factories and ￿xed capital expand more in regions where
labor costs are lower, and possibly fall in regions where labor costs are higher. It is these
predictions that we shall test in the next sections using Indian state-industry panel data.
The idea that market liberalization favors the more productive ￿rms at the expense
of the less productive ones is reminiscent of Melitz (2003). In his theory, ￿rms with
heterogenous productivities can either produce for the domestic market or export. Trade
liberalization is modelled as either a reduction in the per-unit iceberg cost of export, or
a reduction in the ￿xed cost of exporting. A reform reducing either of these costs causes
more productive ￿rms to expand production whereas it forces the less productive ￿rms
to exit or shut down.10 Melitz￿ s model di⁄ers from ours in two respects. First, it has
only one factor market and ￿rm-level productivity is the only source of heterogeneity,
whereas our focus is on the interplay between liberalization and the heterogeneity in labor
markets. Second, his emphasis is on trade liberalization, while ours is on delicensing.
4 Data
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the main variables that we use in our
analysis. Manufacturing in India is composed of two sub-sectors ￿an unregistered (un-
organized) sector of small ￿rms and a registered (organized) sector of larger ￿rms.11 In
our sample period, the former makes up about 5 percent of state output and the latter
9 percent. Both industrial licensing (via the 1951 Industries Act) and labor market
regulations (via the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act) only apply to ￿rms in the registered
sector. For these reasons our analysis focuses on the registered manufacturing sector.
We have data at the three-digit industry level for the period 1980-1997 (which covers
delicensing) for the sixteen main states of India. For each three-digit industry we can
track what happened to entry, output, employment and investment in each of the main
Indian states across this period. We then use codings of the state level amendments
10In his model, the reduction in trade costs induces entry by more productive ￿rms which can a⁄ord
the ￿xed exporting cost. This increases domestic labor demand and therefore the real domestic wage
rate, which in turn forces more low productivity ￿rms to exit, as their pro￿t margins become too small
for them to cover their ￿xed production costs.
11Under the Factories Act of 1948 enterprises are required to register if either (i) they have more
than ten employees and use electric power or (ii) they have more than twenty employees and do not use
electric power.
11to this 1947 Industrial Disputes Act to capture whether labor regulation in a state is
moving in a pro-worker or pro-employer direction. The state-industry panel data set
we construct in this way allows us to study the links between nationwide delicensing,
labor market regulations at the state level, and manufacturing performance at the state-
industry level.
4.1 Delicensing and Trade Protection
To construct our delicensing measure we ￿rst assigned three-digit codes to all the in-
dustries licensed under the 1951 Industries Act (and subsequent amendments to that
Act). We then used statements on industrial policy, press notes and noti￿cations issued
by the federal government to construct a delicensing dummy variable which is equal to
one if all or part of a three-digit manufacturing industry is delicensed in a particular
year and to zero otherwise. Separate, independent codings were carried out to ensure
consistency. This policy measure tells us when each three-digit industry was delicensed
within the 1980-1997 period.12 Figure 1 plots when di⁄erent three-digit industries were
delicensed. The 1985 delicensing wave associated with Rajiv Gandhi￿ s rise to power
in 1984 and the 1991 wave associated with Narasimha Rao￿ s take over following Rajiv
Gandhi￿ s assassination in 1991, are both clearly visible. There is little delicensing ac-
tion away from these leadership transitions. In the 1985-1990 wave about one third of
all three-digit industries are delicensed and in the 1991-1997 wave a further half of all
three-digit industries are delicensed. About one tenth of three-digit industries remain
licensed at the end of our data period in 1997. To take account of this variation we
construct a second measure of delicensing where we have separate dummies for whether
a three-digit industry is delicensed in the 1985-1990 wave or the 1991-1997 wave. Table
1 documents that the number of industries, share of output and share of employment
delicensed rises ￿rst in 1985 and then again post-1990.
We also construct measures of tari⁄ barriers over time for each three-digit industry
for the period 1980-1997. We exploit information on o¢ cial rates of duty applied to
highly disaggregated products in the Customs Tari⁄ of India manuals issued through
the Central Board of Excise and Custom. Indian tari⁄s comprise a basic rate of duty,
an auxiliary rate of duty, and a countervailing duty. We combine the three rates of duty
according to the o¢ cial formula for the applied tari⁄ rate, as discussed in further detail
in the data appendix. Prior to 1988, the tari⁄ data are reported for approximately one
thousand one hundred products of the Brussels Tari⁄ Nomenclature (BTN). From 1988
onwards, even more ￿nely-detailed data are available for approximately ￿ve thousand
six-digit products of the Harmonised System (HS).
We use standard mappings between each of the trade classi￿cations and the three-
digit industry classi￿cation used in the delicensing measure and in our data on industrial
performance. The mappings in Debroy and Santhanam (1993) allocate each product to
an individual three-digit manufacturing industry. Industry tari⁄s were calculated as the
arithmetic average of all products allocated to an industry.13 Our tari⁄ measures have
12A full account of how the delicensing variable was coded for each three-digit industry in India is
available in a web-based data appendix.
13We take arithmetic averages rather than weighting by import shares to avoid the bias introduced
12the attractive feature that they capture the actual tari⁄rate applied by customs o¢ cials
at the Indian border, taking into account auxiliary and countervailing duty. The tari⁄
data provide a direct measure of the evolving Indian trade policy regime and enable us
to control for the e⁄ects of trade liberalization in our regressions. In Table 1 we see how
our applied tari⁄ measure is high and relatively ￿ at across the 1980-1990 period and
then falls dramatically post-1990 (starting in 1991).
4.2 Industrial Performance
We match our delicensing measure with state-industry panel data for the period 1980-
1997 drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries. This is the most disaggregated level
at which one can obtain representative industrial data across the pre- and post-licensing
periods. The Annual Survey of Industries is in part a census and in part a survey
of registered manufacturing activity. Data on industry, location, inputs and outputs
are collected at the factory level. Factories, as de￿ned by the 1948 Factories Act, are
manufacturing establishments or plants which employ more then ten employees with
electricity or more than twenty employees without electricity. A ￿rm may therefore
comprise several factories. All factories with more than 100 employees are included in
the census sector. Factories with less than 100 employees form the sample sector. The
sampling unit is a state and three-digit industry, so that the data are representative at
the state-three-digit industry level. In the data made available to us, the factory-level
data has been aggregated to the state-three-digit industry level, weighting by the inverse
of the sampling probabilities (typically one third in the sample sector and one in the
census sector) to ensure the representativeness of the data.
We focus on the 16 main Indian states, which account for around 95 per cent of
the Indian population. Since we are interested in examining the relative performance of
di⁄erent states within the same three-digit industry, we restrict our attention to state-
industries on which data exist for at least ten years and to industries where at least ￿ve
states are active within the same three-digit industry in any year. This leaves us with an
unbalanced panel of approximately 24,000 observations on an average of 85 three-digit
industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. We also use
a balanced panel data set which contains approximately 18,000 observations on state-
industries that exist in all 18 years of the data. The balanced panel comprises an average
of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Table 1 reports
the mean and standard deviation of real output, employment, number of factories, real
￿xed capital across industries and states over time for the unbalanced panel.
4.3 Labor Market Regulation
India is a federal democracy and under the Indian Constitution of 1950 industrial re-
lations is a concurrent subject. This implies that central and state governments have
joint jurisdiction over labor regulation legislation. The key piece of central legislation
is the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 which sets out the conciliation, arbitration and
by endogenous import shares. With elastic demand, higher tari⁄s reduce the share of a product in
industry imports.
13adjudication procedures to be followed in the case of an industrial dispute. The Act was
designed to o⁄er workers in the organized sector some protection against exploitation
by employers. The Act is comprised of seven chapters and forty sections, specifying the
powers of government, courts and tribunals, unions and workers and the exact proce-
dures that have to be followed in resolving industrial disputes.14 It has been extensively
amended by state governments during the post-Independence period. It is these amend-
ments that we use to study the impact of labor market regulation on manufacturing
performance and poverty.
We extend the coding of amendments carried out by Besley and Burgess (2004) for
the 1958 and 1992 period. The coding is based on reading all state level amendments
to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 from Malik (1997). Thus although all states
have the same starting point, they diverged from one another over time. Each amend-
ment is coded as being either neutral, pro-worker or pro-employer. For the purposes
of quantitative analysis, we coded each pro-worker amendment as a one, each neutral
amendment as a zero, and each pro-employer amendment as a minus one. If there were
multiple amendments in a state in a year we add together the di⁄erent amendments
to give the net direction of change. Figure 2 graphs the history of regulatory change
across states obtained using this coding procedure over the 1980-1997 period. Labor
regulations exhibit signi￿cant variation across states and time.
This method classi￿es states as either ￿treatment￿or ￿control￿states. The latter are
states that do not experience any amendment activity in a pro-worker or pro-employer
direction over the 1958-1997 period. In Figure 2 these are the ￿ at line states which lie
on the zero line. There are six of these: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. Among those that have passed amendments, our method
classi￿es six states Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan
and Tamil Nadu as ￿pro-employer￿ . In Figure 2 these states lie below the zero line. This
leaves four ￿pro-worker￿states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa and West Bengal which
lie above the zero line.
There is a growing body of evidence that suggest that our labor regulation measure is
capturing salient elements of the investment climate in Indian states. Besley and Burgess
(2004), for example, present evidence that more pro-worker labor regulation is strongly
positively correlated with measures of industrial disputes such as work-days lost through
strikes and lock-outs for the pre-1992 period. Sanyal and Menon (2005) demonstrate
that new industrial plants in India tend to open more in pro-employer states which su⁄er
less from industrial disputes.
As Figure 2 makes it clear there is some variation in the direction of amendments
across states during our 1980-1997 period. We can therefore examine whether this
variation a⁄ects industrial performance at the state-industry level. Our main focus of
interest, however, is on the interaction between nationwide delicensing and state labor
regulation. We look at this interaction using both the time varying labor regulation
14The seven chapters cover: (I) de￿nitions; (II) authorities under this Act; (III) reference of disputes
to Boards, Courts or Tribunals; (IV) procedures, powers and duties of authorities; (V) strikes and
lockouts, lay-o⁄ and retrenchment, unfair labour practices; (VI) penalties and (VII) miscellaneous (see
Malik, 1997).
14measure and a simpler measure which classi￿es states into pro-employer, neutral and
pro-worker categories which are time invariant.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Method
We run panel data di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence regressions of the form:
yist = ￿is + ￿t + ￿dit + ￿rst + ￿(rst)(dit) + ￿z + "ist (11)
where yist is a (logged) three-digit state-industry outcome variable, dit is a dummy
variable which switches on (i.e., takes the value of unity) in the year a three-digit industry
is delicensed and then stays on thereafter (see Figure 1), rst is the labor regulation
measure measured in state s at time t (see Figure 2), z are control variables such as
industry and state time trends, ￿is are state-industry ￿xed e⁄ects which control for any
unobserved time invariant determinants of net entry in a particular three-digit industry
in a speci￿c state (e.g. natural endowments, location), and ￿t are year dummies which
control for common macroeconomic shocks. The variable uist is a stochastic error. To
address serial correlation concerns and to allow for heteroskedasticity, the standard errors
are clustered on state-three-digit industry (see Bertrand, Mullainathan and Du￿ o 2004).
In the speci￿cation shown the level e⁄ect of delicensing (￿) captures the impact of
delicensing for a control state that has not amended labor regulation in either a pro-
worker or pro-employer direction (rst = 0). We are interested in assessing how the impact
on industrial performance of a common delicensing reform varies according to the state
institutional environment. The impact of delicensing for pro-worker or pro-employer
states is found from the sum of the main e⁄ect and the interaction e⁄ect evaluated at
the value of state labor regulation (￿ +￿rst). The theory presented in section 3 predicts
that ￿ should be negative, and the test of this prediction constitutes the core of the
empirical analysis.
5.2 Average Effects of Delicensing on Entry and Output
Before turning to the main analysis we examine a speci￿cation without the interaction
term to see whether delicensing a⁄ects entry. This is an important check as it allows
us to test whether the licensing system really acted as a barrier to entry. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2 con￿rms that this is the case for our unbalanced and balanced
panels. Delicensing is associated with an increase in the number of factories operating
in a three-digit industry. The estimated coe¢ cient on the delicensing variable is positive
and highly statistically signi￿cant, implying an increase in the number of factories within
an industry of around 5-6 percent.
In column (3), we split out the two waves of reforms by including separate delicensing
dummies according to whether an industry was delicensed between 1985 and 1990 or
between 1991 and 1997. Both delicensing variables are signi￿cant and of similar mag-
nitude indicating that the reform waves that begun in 1985 and 1991 respectively were
both e⁄ective in encouraging entry. We ￿nd a similar pattern when we run the same
regression on the balanced panel in column (4). Our results are robust to the inclusion
15of state time trends which helps to control for unobserved time-varying state character-
istics (column (5)). Including time trends for individual three-digit industries to control
for di⁄erential patterns of technological change and weighting by employment share in
1980 to control for sampling errors also leaves our results una⁄ected (column (6)). We
continue to ￿nd that delicensed industries experience signi￿cantly more rapid growth in
the number of factories relative to industries that remain subject to licensing.
Table 3 carries out the same analysis for output. The evidence turns out to be
mixed. We ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect on output in the unbalanced (column (1)) nor
in the balanced sample (column (2)). However, when we separate out the 1985-1990
and 1991-1997 delicensing waves (columns (3) and (4)) we see evidence that the 1985-
1990 delicensing wave was associated with an increase in industrial output while the
1991-1997 wave was not. We ￿nd an identical pattern of results for employment. In
the speci￿cations with state (column (5) and industry (column (6)) time trends we
continue to ￿nd no signi￿cant association between delicensing and industrial output.
This suggests that additions to output and employment from entry and expansion in
some state-industries is counterbalanced by contraction (and, to some degree, exit) in
others.15 The average e⁄ect of delicensing on output and employment is, at best, small.
We now turn our attention to the heterogeneous response of states and industries to
delicensing, which is the main focus of our analysis.
5.3 Basic Results
In column (1) of Table 4 we include both our labor regulation and delicensing measures
separately. As before the e⁄ect of delicensing remains insigni￿cant. The coe¢ cient on the
labor regulation measure, however, is negative and signi￿cant. Pro-worker regulations
have a negative e⁄ect on registered manufacturing output. This result lines up with the
state level results in Besley and Burgess (2004) for the longer 1958-1992 period.
In column (2) we include the interaction term between our labor regulation and deli-
censing measures. The coe¢ cient is negative and signi￿cant. This tells us that when
delicensing occurred, state-industries in more pro-worker states experienced smaller (pos-
sibly negative) increases in output than those located in pro-employer states. We ￿nd
a similar result when we run the regression on the balanced panel (column (3)). The
coe¢ cients of the level e⁄ect of delicense capture the e⁄ect of the reform for states which
did not amend the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act. For such states, as well as for those
states which amended the Act in a pro-employer direction the reform had, on average,
a positive e⁄ect. However, the e⁄ect was negative for all states which amended the Act
in a pro-worker direction.
Column (4) breaks out our delicensing measure into the 1985-1990 and 1991-1997
waves and interacts this with the our labor regulation measure in the year prior to
an industry being delicensed.16 We ￿nd that the coe¢ cients on both interactions are
negative and signi￿cant (and, actually, very similar). The institutional environment
15Labor regulations and bankruptcy laws limit the exit in India which helps explain why we observe
positive e⁄ects of delicensing on number of factories.
16Results are similar if we use the time varying labor regulation mesure interacted with dummies for
delicensing in the 1985-1990 and 1991-1997 periods.
16prevailing in a state in the pre-delicensing year a⁄ected the impact of delicensing in both
the 1985 and 1991 waves. This is an important result as is shows that both delicensing
waves are important in explaining our interaction result in column (2).
In column (5) of Table 4 we use the average of our labor regulation measure in each
state across the 1980-1997 period (see Figure 2) to divide the states into three groups ￿
pro-worker states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, West Bengal) where average labor regulation
score is above zero, control states (Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh) where there has been no amendments in either
direction since 1947 and hence the labor regulation score is zero and pro-worker states
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu) where the labor reg-
ulation score is below zero. We interact dummies for pro-worker and pro-employer status
with our delicensing measure leaving control states as the omitted reference category.
Column (5) shows that when delicensing occurs it is the state-industries in pro-employer
states that expand output relative to those in control states. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction between pro-worker status and delicensing is of the opposite sign but is not
signi￿cant.
In column (6) we break our labor regulation even further dividing state into strong
pro-employer (Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu) de￿ned as having an av-
erage score over the period less than ￿1, moderate pro-employer (Karnataka, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh) de￿ned as having a score between 0 and 1; moderate pro-worker (Gu-
jarat, Orissa) de￿ned as having a score between 0 and 1 and strong pro-worker (Maha-
rashtra, West Bengal) de￿ned as having a score greater than 1: The omitted category, as
before, is the neutral states. We see in column (6) that strong pro-employer and strong
pro-worker states move in opposite directions relative to neutral states. Both these in-
teraction e⁄ects are highly signi￿cant but of opposite signs. The e⁄ects of nationwide
delicensing are, indeed, unequal depending on the state of labor market institutions in
Indian states.
In column (7) we take the labor regulation score in the year prior to delicensing.
This helps to guard against our interaction e⁄ect being driven by changes in labor
regulation across time. The interaction terms remains negative and signi￿cant and of
similar magnitude relative to the baseline result in column (2). This complements the
analysis where we interacted the labor regulation score prior to delicensing for three-digit
industries delicensed in the 1985-1990 and 1991-1997 waves (column (4)). In column (8)
we include political controls to control for unobserved government policies which may
a⁄ect output. These controls are the share of seats in the state legislature held by the
￿ve main political groupings in India: the congress parties, the hard left parties, the
Janata parties, the Hindu nationalist parties and regional parties. The composition
of the political groupings is discussed in further detail in the data appendix and the
excluded group is other parties. The interaction between labor regulation and delicensing
continues to be negative and signi￿cant.
Column (9) includes state-time trends to take account of the unobserved time varying
e⁄ects of state characteristics on output. This is important as there is a whole host of
unobserved state characteristics which may a⁄ect the evolution of industrial output in a
state. Column (10) includes three-digit industry-time trends to control for time varying
17e⁄ects of industry characteristics on output and weights by employment share in 1980
to control for sampling errors. Industries, for example, may experience di⁄erent rates of
technological change. In both speci￿cations the interaction between labor regulation and
delicensing remains signi￿cant indicating that our basic result in column (2) is robust to
the inclusion of such controls.17 Taken together the results in Table 4 con￿rm the main
prediction of our theory that delicensing has an expansionary e⁄ect in pro-employer
states relative to pro-worker states.
In Table 5 we widen our set of left hand-side variables to include employment, number
of factories and ￿xed capital. In columns (1)-(3) we see a pattern of results for employ-
ment which mirrors that for output. Moving in a pro-worker direction is associated
with falls in employment (column (1)). When delicensing occurs being in a pro-worker
state is associated with a contraction of employment relative to being in a pro-employer
state (columns (2) and (3)). The fact that the output and employment e⁄ects line up
increases our con￿dence that state labor institutions are important in determining the
impact of delicensing on output.
Delicensing allows ￿rms to enter new state-industries or expand production in exist-
ing establishments beyond what was permitted under pre-existing licenses. Firms may
also decide to invest in new production processes and technologies to increase their pro-
ductivity as a means of capturing a greater share of the market. The extent to which
they respond through these mechanisms should depend upon the quality of the institu-
tional environment in which ￿rms are embedded. Ceteris paribus we might expect the
entry and investment response of state-industries to the same delicensing shock to be
di⁄erent depending on whether they are in pro-worker or pro-employer state.
Columns (4)-(9) of Table 5 investigate this possibility using number of factories and
￿xed capital as proxies of investment. In Column (4) we see that moving in a pro-worker
direction is associated with a reduction in entry into a state-industry whereas delicensing
is associated with an increase in entry. Delicensing and labor regulation thus pull in
opposite directions. In column (5) we see that the interaction between delicensing and
labor regulation is negative and signi￿cant. This tells us that when delicensing occurred,
state-industries in more pro-employer states experienced larger increases in net entry
than those located in pro-worker states. In column (6) we divide states into pro-worker
and pro-employer categories and interact these with our delicensing measure leaving
control states as the comparison group. In line with our results for output we ￿nd that,
relative to the situation in control states, it is pro-employer states that are attracting
the bulk of new entry after delicensing occurs. This helps to explain why we see an
expansion in output in state-industries located in these states following delicensing.
In columns (7)-(9) we see a similar pattern for ￿xed capital. Pro-worker regulation
is associated with lower state-industry investment (column (7)). When a state-industry
17The results are similar if we include three-digit industry time trends but do not weight observations
by employment shares. The estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction between delicensing and labor
regulation in this case is -0.067 (s.e. 0.013). We also run a speci￿cation where we include both state
trends and three digit industry-time trends. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between delicensing and
labor regulation continues to be negative and statistically signi￿cant -0.033 (s.e. 0.016). In this case,
however, the coe¢ cient becomes marginally insigni￿cant (-0.020, s.e 0.013) when we also weight by
employment shares in 1980.
18is delicensed we see that labor institutions have the usual impact: industries in pro-
employer states attract more investments than their counterparts in pro-worker states
within the same three-digit sector (column (8)). Relative to control states it is pro-
employer states that have bene￿ted from delicensing (column (9)). The fact that entry,
￿xed capital and output results line up points to investment incentives di⁄ering across
pro-worker and pro-employer states when delicensing occurs. The investment results
are important as they help uncover the mechanism as to why output (and employment)
expands more in pro-employer states relative to neutral and pro-worker states when and
three-digit industry is delicensed.
5.4 Magnitudes and Counterfactuals
The estimates in Table 4 can be used to quantify the impact of the dismantling of the
license raj on industrial development across Indian states with di⁄erent labor market
institutions. From equation (11), the percentage change in an industrial outcome due
to delicensing varies with state labor market institutions as follows:
% impact delicensing = ￿ + ￿rst (12)
We can use this formula to evaluate the impact of delicensing on aggregate measures
of industrial development. To this aim, we ￿rst run the speci￿cation from column (2)
of Table 4 and calculate, using the formula (12), a counterfactual for what the log-
production level would have been in a state-industry had delicensing not occurred. We
then take exponents and sum across industries to evaluate the predicted impact of deli-
censing on total manufacturing output in each state. Figure 3 graphs the di⁄erence
between predicted real output and this counterfactual for all Indian states. This exer-
cise takes into account not only the estimated impact of delicensing but also industrial
structure in each Indian states.
The largest positive e⁄ects of delicensing on state output are found in Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (and to a lower extent Karnataka, Kerala and Rajahstan),
i.e., the states with the most pro-employer labor regulations. The largest negative ef-
fects are found in West Bengal and Maharashtra, i.e., the state with most pro-worker
labor regulations. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu output in the man-
ufacturing sector was 15% higher in 1997 than if there had been no reform. In West
Bengal, to the opposite, output was 20% lower in 1997 than if there had been no re-
form. In many Indian states (for example, those with neutral labor market institutions),
the e⁄ects of the reforms are of negligible size, re￿ ecting the small magnitude of the
average e⁄ects. The results are similar for employment, number of factories and ￿xed
capital.18 The consequences for delicensing impact of having di⁄erent types of labor
market regulations in an Indian state are thus sizeable.
18Due to the reforms, employment was 13% larger in Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and 13% lower
in West Bengal. Fixed capital was 9% larger in Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and 9% lower in West
Bengal.
195.5 Trade Liberalization
While the main focus of our analysis is on delicensing, trade liberalization via reductions
in tari⁄s was another important form of product market deregulation which took place
in India during the 1990￿ s. We have constructed a measure of tari⁄ barriers for each
three-digit industry in India for the period 1980-1997. Tari⁄s were relatively ￿ at and
in some cases increasing for the period 1980-90. Tari⁄ reductions were concentrated
from 1991 onwards and and were therefore somewhat contemporaneous with the second
delicensing wave.
In column (1) of Table 6 we ￿nd a positive but statistically insigni￿cant average e⁄ect
of tari⁄s on output. This lines up with the weak e⁄ects of delicensing on output that we
observe in Table 3. In column (2) of Table 6 we interact tari⁄s with labor regulation:
the estimated interaction coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant. This implies that, within
each industry, tari⁄ reductions led to output expansion in pro-employer states relative
to pro-worker states. This fact is con￿rmed in column (3) where we interact pro-worker
and pro-employer status with our tari⁄ measure leaving control states as the omitted
reference group. The pro-employer interaction is negative and signi￿cant indicating that
tari⁄reductions had a more positive e⁄ect on pro-employer states relative to neutral and
pro-worker states. This lines up with the result on delicensing in Table 4.
In column (4) we include the interaction of labor regulation both with tari⁄ and
with delicensing. The delicensing interaction remains negative and signi￿cant indicat-
ing robustness to controlling for trade liberalization. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient
is almost una⁄ected by the inclusion of the tari⁄ interaction. The same is true when
we include the time invariant measure of labor regulation in the year prior to delicens-
ing (column (5)). The tari⁄ interaction itself is positively signed although no longer
statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels.
In column (6) we break out delicensing into the 1985-1990 and 1991-1997 waves and
interact with labor regulation. Both interaction terms remain negative and signi￿cant
and of similar magnitude to the speci￿cation in column (4) of Table 4 where tari⁄s and
their interactions with labor regulation were not included. This is a useful robustness
check, as the ￿rst delicensing wave precedes the period of tari⁄ reduction, while the
second is contemporaneous to it. The size of the coe¢ cient on the tari⁄interaction falls
but remains signi￿cant in column (5) at the 10 percent level. In summary, our delicensing
results are robust to including tari⁄s and of their interaction with labor regulation.
5.6 Additional Robustness Checks
We now consider a variety of robustness checks to address two further important issues.
First, we check that it is the variation over industries and time embedded in our delicense
measure that is responsible for our results. Second, we discuss issues related to the
endogeneity of the timing and sequencing of reforms.
5.6.1 Spurious Correlation
In Table 7 we undertake two falsi￿cation exercises that compare the results of our base-
line speci￿cation in column (2) of Table 4 with ￿ndings from a sequence of randomly
20generated (￿placebo￿ ) delicensing measures. The random delicensing measures were con-
structed as follows. For each industry, we randomly chose a year from our time period
and imposed that random year as a hypothetical time when the industry was delicensed.
Each random delicensing measure is zero before the hypothetical year of delicensing
and one afterwards. Each falsi￿cation exercise involved a Monte Carlo simulation that
constructed one thousand of these random delicensing measures.
The ￿rst falsi￿cation exercise re-estimated the baseline speci￿cation from column (2)
of Table 4 using each of the randomly generated delicensing measures in the place of
our baseline measure. We included both the level of the random delicensing variable
and its interaction with labor regulation. We compared the statistical signi￿cance of
the interaction term between random delicensing and labor regulation in each of the one
hundred regressions with the statistical signi￿cance of the interaction term using our
actual delicensing measure. We also compared the overall goodness of ￿t of speci￿cations
with random and actual delicensing as measured by the regression R2. As shown in
Column (1) of Table 7, the absolute value of the t-statistic on our actual delicensing
interaction exceeded the absolute value of the t-statistic on the random delicensing
interaction in more than 99% of the 1000 simulations. The regression R2 using our actual
delicensing measure exceeded that using the random delicensing measure in more than
96% of the 1000 simulations. Both ￿ndings suggest that there is important information
in our actual measure of the timing and identity of industries delicensed based on the
o¢ cial policy announcements of the Ministry of Industry.
The second falsi￿cation exercise re-estimated the baseline speci￿cation from column
(2) of Table 4 including each of the randomly generated delicensing measures alongside
our baseline measure. We included both a level and interaction term with labor regula-
tion for random and actual delicensing measures. As shown in column (2) of Table 7, the
interaction term between actual delicensing and labor regulation was statistically sig-
ni￿cant in all 1000 simulations, while the interaction term between random delicensing
and labor regulation was statistically signi￿cant in 11% of the simulations. The actual
delicensing measure dominates random measures, though the interaction term between
random delicensing and labor regulation is sometimes statistically signi￿cant, which is
not surprising given the necessary positive correlation between actual and random deli-
censing. Again these results again provide clear evidence that the timing and identity
of the industries delicensed matters for our results. Taken together, the results tighten
the link between delicensing in a particular industry and a speci￿c time period and the
post-delicensing impact of labor market institutions.
Column (1) of Table 8 continues in this vein. We construct a hypothetical measure of
delicensing, where we falsely assume that industries delicensed during our sample were
delicensed three years prior to their true year of delicensing. We include the hypotheti-
cal measure and the interaction between the hypothetical measure and labor regulation
alongside our baseline measures in the speci￿cation of column (2) of Table 4. The esti-
mated coe¢ cient on the interaction between our baseline measure and labor regulation
remains of a similar size and statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on the interaction
term between the hypothetical measure and labor regulation is insigni￿cant. Again this
is evidence that our delicensing measure is capturing salient elements of the competitive
21environment facing industries in Indian states.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 include interaction terms between labor regulation
and a post-1985 dummy and a post-1991 dummy, respectively.19 This is to control for
the possibility that our delicensing variable captures ￿across the board￿e⁄ects of the
1985 and 1991 reforms (rather than those limited to the industries that were delicensed).
We continue to ￿nd a negative and highly signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term
between delicensing and labor regulation, suggesting that it is indeed the cross-industry
variation in our delicensing measure that is responsible for our results.
Finally, we checked that our ￿ndings are not driven by individual states. We sequen-
tially excluded each state from the sample and re-estimated our baseline speci￿cation.
In each case, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cient
on the interaction term between delicensing and labor regulation equalled the value
estimated for the full sample at the 5% level. This suggests that our results are captur-
ing a general relationship between industrial performance, delicensing and labor market
institutions rather than the in￿ uence of individual states.
5.6.2 Endogeneity of Reforms
Delicensing was a centrally managed technocratic reform that seems to have been trig-
gered by largely unexpected shocks. The ￿rst wave of delicensing followed Rajiv Gandhi￿ s
sudden rise to power in 1985 following the assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi a
year before. The second wave of delicensing followed the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
and the sudden rise to power of Narasimha Rao. Similarly, large-scale trade liberalization
did not occur until 1991 and was again driven by the sudden rise to power of Narasimha
Rao, the macroeconomic crisis, and the adoption of the IMF structural adjustment pro-
gramme. The concern that ￿rms may have acted in anticipation of economic reforms
seems therefore to be of limited importance.
A potentially more severe issue is the selection of industries that were delicensed
in di⁄erent waves. In particular, reformers in 1985 may have not chosen industries
randomly.20 The endogeneous sequencing would be a problem for our analysis if the se-
lection criterion were correlated with the expected future performance of state-industries
at the time of the reform. We could also worry that industries were selected according
to political criteria that would be correlated with the distribution of political power
across states with di⁄erent labor market institutions. These concerns could be properly
addressed if it were possible to identify valid instruments, namely, variables which are
correlated with the delicense indicator, but not directly with state-industry economic
performance trends. Unfortunately, this strategy did not appear feasible to us.
We performed instead some imperfect experiments, which we report in Table 9,
aimed to show that endogeneity is unlikely to be a ￿rst-order issue. In column (1),
we run a cross-section regression of the year in which an industry was delicensed on
19We cannot control simultaneously for the two dummy variables, as a combination of them would be
almost perfectly collinear to our delicense measure (since almost all industries were delicensed in either
1985 or 1991).
20The concern is less severe for the 1991 wave as this covered most of the remaining industries, and
the criterion for the exclusion of few industries was their strategic, environmental and social importance.
22output growth during the 1980-84 period prior to the ￿rst wave of delicensing. We ￿nd
no evidence of a relationship between when an industry is delicensed and pre-reform
output growth. In column (2), we run a similar experiment for trade liberalization.
We run a cross-section regression of the percentage point reduction in tari⁄s between
1988 and 1997 on rates of growth of output respectively during 1980-84. We ￿nd no
correlation between the size of future tari⁄ reductions and output growth prior to trade
liberalization. Therefore, neither of the experiments detect any evidence of systematic
di⁄erences in economic performance across industries that are correlated with future
delicensing or trade liberalization.21
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, we examine whether delicensing and trade lib-
eralization were in￿ uenced by politico-economic factors (e.g., protection for sale, as
emphasized by Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Political parties have di⁄erent attitudes
towards economic liberalization, partly for ideological reasons and partly because of the
nature of their constituency. The distribution of stakes political parties hold across states
(which, if politics are persistent, is likely to be correlated with labor market institutions)
may therefore have shaped the intensity of the support parties o⁄ered to the delicensing
of particular industries. For instance, political parties which were opposed to liberaliza-
tion (e.g., because it represents the interests of either unionized workers or insider ￿rms)
would tend to oppose particularly strongly delicensing industries that represent a large
share of employment in states where they have large stakes.
To test whether such politico-economic factors in￿ uenced the timing of reforms, we
exploit variation across states and over time in the political power of parties and in
the employment structure within the manufacturing sector. In particular, we construct
industry-employment weighted averages of the share of seats in state legislatures held by
each of the main political groupings in India. We then run an industry-time regression of
delicensing on these measures. This will give us a sense of the extent to which the central
delicensing process is a⁄ected by state politics. Since elections are held approximately
every four years, we lag the political measures four years. We ￿nd no evidence of
a correlation between an industry being delicensed and industry-employment weighted
state political representation (column (3)). Column (4) shows a similar lack of correlation
between the level of tari⁄barriers and state political representation. While these results
cannot rule out the in￿ uence of other politico-economic factors, they provide no evidence
of a relationship between reform and patterns of political power across states.
6 Conclusions
The question of how to encourage industrial development has been one of the holy grails
of development work. Intellectual fashions in this area have changed radically in the last
￿fty years. India is an emblematic case, as it began its post-independence life as the
poster child for planned industrialization, and shifted more recently to a market-oriented
strategy.
In this paper, we study the e⁄ects of the progressive elimination of the system of
21Similar results were found using other measures of pre-reform industrial performance such as em-
ployment or labor productivity growth during 1980-84.
23industrial regulations on entry and production, known as the ￿license raj￿ , on registered
manufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with
di⁄erent labor market regulations. The punchline of the paper is contained in Figure
3 ￿registered manufacturing fell in some states and rose in others in response to the
same delicensing reform depending on the state of labor institutions in an Indian state.
Therefore, in line with our theoretical predictions we ￿nd that delicensing resulted in
a reallocation of industrial production from states with pro-worker labor institutions to
states with pro-employer labor institutions.
Our results emphasize how local institutions and policies matter for whether a region
bene￿ts or is harmed by nationwide liberalization reforms. This is in line with a small but
growing trade liberalization literature which points to heterogeneous e⁄ects depending on
the local institutional setting in which liberalization takes place. The take home message
is that the focus should be squarely on the local policy and institutional environment in
thinking about how to encourage growth in particular regions during periods of economic
reforms. Understanding which elements of this environment are important is critical to
designing public policy to encourage industrialization and growth in a changing world.
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7 Data Appendix
The main source of data is the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). Our dataset
covers the 16 main Indian states that account for around 95% of the Indian popula-
tion. Data on production activity in the ASI are reported at the level of three-digit
manufacturing industries by state for the period 1980-97. Number of factories is the
number of production units employing ten or more workers with electricity, or twenty
of more workers without electricity, on any day of the preceding twelve months and
therefore registered under sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act 1948. Output
is gross output, which comprises the total ex-factory value of products and by-products
manufactured as well as other receipts such as receipts from non-industrial services and
additions to the stock of semi-￿nished goods. Employment is all employees, including
production and non-production workers. Fixed capital is the depreciated value of ￿xed
assets that have a normal productive life of more than one year, including machinery,
equipment and structures. Real output is output de￿ ated by industry-speci￿c output
29price de￿ ators from the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics. Real ￿xed cap-
ital is ￿xed capital de￿ ated by the output price de￿ ator for Machinery and Equipment
from the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics.
The ASI data are reported according to the National Industrial Classi￿cation (NIC)
1970 from 1980-88 and according to the NIC 1987 from 1989-97. Most three-digit in-
dustries can be mapped one-to-one between the 1970 and 1987 classi￿cations. In those
cases where a one-to-one mapping did not exist, we aggregated three-digit industries to-
gether until a one-to-one mapping could be constructed. A full correspondence between
the 1970 and 1987 NIC classi￿cations is available from the authors on request. Mis-
cellaneous manufacturing industries are catch-all categories which are likely to include
heterogeneous activities in di⁄erent states and therefore they are excluded from the sam-
ple. The three-digit industries ￿ Minting of Currency Coins￿and ￿ Processing of Nuclear
Fuels￿are likely to be shaped by non-economic factors and therefore these industries are
also excluded from the sample.
The ASI is a census of factories above 100 employees and of factories in certain
speci￿ed industries. The data on factories below 100 employees is a strati￿ed sample.
Some state-industries with low employment levels are observed for a small number of
years and repeatedly enter and exit the data. We restrict attention to state-industries
on which there are data for at least 10 years. We also report results for the balanced
panel of state-industries that are observed in all eighteen years from 1980 to 1997.
Our delicensing measure was constructed as follows. Appendix II of The Industries
Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) of 1951 reports a comprehensive list of the
￿Scheduled Industries￿subject to industrial licensing (Malik 1997). We assigned three-
digit codes to each of the scheduled industries listed in the Act. From the Press Notices
and Noti￿cations issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, we tracked the years
in which individual scheduled industries were delicensed during the 1980s (Chaudhary
1987, various issues of the Government of India￿ s Economic Survey, and the Handbook
of Industrial Policy and Statistics 1987). In 1991 industrial licensing was disbanded in
all but a small number of industries where licensing was retained ￿for reasons related to
security and strategic concerns, social reasons, problems related to safety and over-riding
environmental issues, manufacture of products of hazardous nature and articles of elitist
consumption.￿(Government of India 1991). The Statement of Industrial Policy in 1991
speci￿es a list of industries where licensing was retained. Subsequent revisions to the
list of licensed industries from 1991 onwards were tracked from the Press Notices and
Noti￿cations published in various issues of the Handbook of Industrial Statistics. In this
way, we were able to determine the year in which each individual three-digit registered
manufacturing industry was delicensed. Two independent codings were carried out to
ensure consistency. Delicense is a dummy variable which is equal to one from the year
in which all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed and zero otherwise. A full
account of how the delicensing variable was coded for each three-digit industry in India
is available in a web-based data appendix.
Tari⁄rates for three-digit manufacturing industries were constructed based on actual
rates of duty speci￿ed in the Customs Tari⁄ of India manuals published through the
Central Board of Excise and Customs, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance. The
30applied tari⁄ is composed of basic duty, auxiliary duty and countervailing duty. The
majority of duties are ad valorem. Speci￿c duties were converted into ad valorem rates
based on historical price data for products. The applied tari⁄is calculated according to
the following formula:
Applied tariff = basic + auxiliary +
(100 + basic + auxiliary) ￿ countervailing
100
Data were collected on rates of duty for 1981 and 1984 based on the product clas-
si￿cation of the Brussels Tari⁄ Nomenclature (BTN). BTN products were mapped to
four and ￿ve-digit Standard International Trade Classi￿cation Revision 2 (SITC Rev. 2)
products using an o¢ cial concordance from the World Customs Organization (WCO).
SITC Rev.2 products were then mapped to three-digit industries using the concordance
in Debroy and Santhanam (1993).
Data were collected on rates of duty for 1988, 1992 and 1997 based on the six-digit
product classi￿cation of the Harmonized System (HS). HS products were mapped to
three-digit industries using the concordance in Debroy and Santhanam (1993).
The applied tari⁄for each three-digit industry was calculated as the arithmetic aver-
age of the applied tari⁄s on all products mapped to the three-digit industry. Three-digit
industry tari⁄s for 1980 were assumed to equal their values in 1981. Three-digit industry
tari⁄s for the years in between 1981, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1997 were calculated using
linear interpolation.
The labor regulation variable comes from state speci￿c text amendments to the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as reported in Malik (1997). Following Besley and Burgess
(2004) each amendment was coded in the following way: a 1 denotes a change that
is pro-worker or anti-employer, a 0 denotes a change that we judged not to a⁄ect the
bargaining power of either workers or employers and a -1 denotes a change which we
regard to be anti-worker or pro-employer. There were 121 state speci￿c amendments
which was coded in this manner. Where there was more than one amendment in a year
we collapsed this information into a single directional measure by adding up the codes
for the di⁄erent constituent amendments. Thus reforms to the regulatory climate are
restricted to taking a value of 1, 0, -1 in any given state and year. To create the measure
we use we then cumulated these scores over time in each state between 1947 and 1997.
The data on political histories comes from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991). This
primary data is aggregated into four political groupings which are de￿ned below and
expressed as shares of the total number of seats in state legislatures. State political
con￿gurations are held constant between elections. In our data period, the relevant
groupings are: the Congress party, the Janata parties, hard left parties and regional
parties. These groupings contain the following parties (i) Congress Party (Indian Na-
tional Congress + Indian Congress Socialist + Indian National Congress Urs + Indian
National Congress Organization), (ii) Janata parties (Lok Dal+Janata+Janata Dal),
(iii) a hard left grouping (Communist Party of India + Communist Party of India Marx-
ist), and a (iv) grouping made up of regional parties.
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Figure 2: Labor Regulation by State
year
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Figure 3: Log Output Relative to Counterfactual Without Delicensing
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Year 
  1980 1985 1990 1997 
      
Delicensing     
      
Number of industries delicensed  0  41  44  102 
Percentage of real output delicensed  0  45.08  53.29  90.58 
Percentage of employment delicensed  0  41.93  46.41  87.52 
      
Trade liberalization      
      
Mean applied tariff  120.51  144.12  134.57  48.10 
  (45.87) (47.57) (38.67) (21.61) 
      
Industrial performance      
      
Mean real output  437613.25  572032.50  867908.75  1624003.50 
  (1173759.75) (1621077.00) (2515327.50) (4536439.50) 
Mean  employment  5033.58 4207.14 4395.67 5801.44 
  (15435.40) (11712.77) (12378.34) (15879.36) 
Mean number of factories  67.51  61.72  64.46  83.63 
  (175.00) (166.61) (186.23) (230.88) 
Mean real fixed capital  128921.71  191542.34  297122.13  694986.44 
 (714071.81)  (900062.56)  (1553109.50)  (2898016.50) 
      
Observations  1164 1370 1417 1207 
Notes: Based on an unbalanced panel including an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. The number of observations reported in the 
table is the number of state-industries in a particular year. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations across state-industries in a particular year. See the data appendix for further information on 
variable definitions and data sources.  
 
 
Table 2: Delicensing and Net Entry in India: 1980-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. The balanced panel concentrates on 3-digit industry-
states that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for 
clustering on 3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. Delicense85 is a dummy 
variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1985 and 1990. Delicense91 is a 
dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1991 and 1997. The weights 
in Column (6) are 1980 employment shares in a state-three-digit industry. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical 
significance at the 10% level. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Log Number of 
Factories 
Log Number of 
Factories 
Log Number of 
Factories 
Log Number of 
Factories 
Log Number of 
Factories 
Log Number of 
Factories 
Delicense  0.049***  0.064***    0.048***  0.048*** 
  (0.018)  (0.020)    (0.018)  (0.018) 
Delicense85     0.055**  0.066**     
     (0.026)  (0.029)     
Delicense91     0.045*  0.063**     
     (0.025)  (0.029)     
Observations 24374  18324  24374  18324  24374  24374 
R-squared 0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.97 
State-industry fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry-time trends  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
State-time  trends  NO NO NO NO YES  NO 
Balanced panel  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Weighting  NO NO NO NO NO YES  
 
 
Table 3: Delicensing and Industrial Performance in India: 1980-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log  Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Delicense  0.017 0.032     0.016 -0.014 
  (0.031) (0.033)     (0.032) (0.020) 
Delicense85     0.069  0.090**     
     (0.043)  (0.046)     
Delicense91     -0.022  -0.016     
     (0.044)  (0.048)     
Observations  24374 18324 24374 18324 24374 24374 
R-squared  0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.94 
State-industry fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-time  trends  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
State-time  trends  NO NO NO NO YES  NO 
Balanced  panel  NO YES  NO YES  NO NO 
Weighting  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. The balanced panel concentrates on state-industries that 
are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on 
3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. Delicense85 is a dummy variable which is 
one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1985 and 1990. Delicense91 is a dummy variable which 
is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1991 and 1997. The weights in Column (6) are 1980 
employment shares in a state-three-digit industry. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
level.  
Table 4: Delicensing, Labor Regulation and Industrial Performance in India: 1980-1997 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10)
 
 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Labor  Regulation  -0.134*** -0.077*** -0.074**  -0.101*** -0.109*** -0.082*** -0.100**  -0.044  -0.022  -0.085*** 
  (0.027)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.026)
Delicense 0.017  0.020 0.038 -0.027 -0.023  0.018 0.018 0.017 0.011
  (0.032)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.050) (0.050)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.023)
Delicense85     0.064
     (0.043)
Delicense91     -0.016
     (0.044)
Labor Regulation × Delicense    -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.076** -0.034* -0.072***
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Pre-Labor Regulation × Delicense      -0.058**
     (0.016)
Labor Regulation × Delicense85      -0.057**
     (0.025)
Labor Regulation × Delicense91      -0.057***
     (0.021)
Pro-worker × Delicense      -0.052
     (0.065)
Pro-employer × Delicense      0.142**
     (0.061)
Strong Pro-worker × Delicense      -0.214***
     (0.068) 
Moderate Pro-worker × Delicense      0.115 
     (0.088) 
Moderate Pro-employer × Delicense      0.107 
     (0.076) 
Strong Pro-employer × Delicense      0.173***
     (0.070) 
Observations  24374 24374 18324 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374
R-squared 0.88  0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.94
State-industry fixed effects  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES
Year  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-time trends  NO  NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO NOY E S
State-time trends  NO  NO NO NO NO NO  NO NOY E S NO
Balanced panel  NO  NOY E S NO NO NO  NO NO NO NO
Weighting  NO  NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO NOY E S
Political controls  NO  NO NO NO NO NO  NOY E S NO NO
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. The balanced panel concentrates on state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit 
industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on 3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. 
Delicense85 is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1985 and 1990. Delicense91 is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit 
industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1991 and 1997. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to generate the 
labor regulation measure..Pre-labor regulation is labor regulation in the year before delicensing. Pro-worker is a dummy which is one for pro-worker states. Pro-employer is a dummy which is one for pro-employer states. Strong pro-worker is a dummy which is one for pro-worker 
states with an average labor regulation score of greater than one. Moderate pro-worker is a dummy which is one for pro-worker states with an average labor regulation score greater than zero and less than or equal to one. Strong and moderate pro-employer are defined analogously. The 
political controls included in Column (8) are the shares of the major Indian political groupings in state legislatures. See the data appendix for further information concerning variables and data sources. The weights in Column (10) are 1980 employment shares in a state-three-digit 
industry. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Delicensing, Labor Regulation, Employment and Investment in India: 1980-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Log 
Employ-
ment 
Log 
Employ-
ment 
Log 
Employ-
ment 
Log 
Number of 
Factories 
Log 
Number of 
Factories 
Log 
Number of 
Factories 
Log Real 
Fixed 
Capital  
Log Real 
Fixed 
Capital 
Log Real 
Fixed 
Capital 
Labor  Regulation  -0.089*** -0.038  -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.007  -0.033**  -0.066**  -0.039  -0.061* 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032) 
Delicense  0.014 0.017 0.012 0.049***  0.051***  0.009 0.030 0.031 -0.070 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.064) 
Labor Regulation × Delicense    -0.060***      -0.051***      -0.032*   
   (0.013)    (0.009)    (0.019)   
Pro-worker  ×  Delicense    -0.101**    -0.028    0.080 
    (0.051)    (0.039)    (0.078) 
Pro-employer  ×  Delicense      0.072    0.117***    0.189** 
    (0.047)    (0.036)    (0.076) 
Observations  24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 24374 
R-squared  0.89 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.84 0.84 
State-industry fixed effects  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for 
clustering on 3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to generate the labor regulation measure. Pro-worker is a dummy which is one for 
pro-worker states. Pro-employer is a dummy which is one for pro-employer states. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
  
Table 6: Trade Liberalization, Labor Regulation and Industrial Performance in India, 1980-97 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 Log  Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Log Real 
Output 
Labor  Regulation    -0.334*** -0.127*** -0.158**  -0.098***  -0.215*** 
    (0.074) (0.027) (0.079) (0.029)  (0.077) 
Delicense     0.033  0.032   
     (0.033)  (0.033)   
Delicense85        0.068 
        (0.044) 
Delicense91        0.004 
        (0.046) 
Tariff  Rate  0.074 0.076 0.180**  0.075 0.076  0.076 
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.079) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.058) 
Labor Regulation × Tariff Rate    0.045***    0.018    0.025* 
   (0.014)   (0.014)    (0.014) 
Pre-labor Regulation × Tariff Rate          0.019   
      (0.016)   
Pro-worker x Tariff Rate      -0.061       
    (0.071)      
Pro-employer x Tariff Rate      -0.198***       
    (0.072)      
Labor Regulation × Delicense        -0.061***     
     (0.017)     
Pre-labor Regulation × Delicense          -0.052***   
      (0.018)   
Labor Regulation × Delicense85            -0.053** 
        (0.025) 
Labor Regulation × Delicense91            -0.047** 
        (0.023) 
Observations  23729 23729 23729 23729 23729  23729 
R-squared  0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88  0.88 
State-industry Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Year  Effects  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on 3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a 
dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. Delicense85 is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero 
otherwise for those industries that were delicensed between 1985 and 1990. Delicense91 is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise for those industries that were 
delicensed between 1991 and 1997. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to generate the labor regulation measure. Pre-labor regulation is state 
labor regulation in the year prior to delicensing. Tariff Rate is the log applied tariff rate. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 
Table 7: Effects of Actual and Random Delicensing 
 (1)  (2) 
Percentage of times that the t-statistic on the actual delicensing and labor 
regulation interaction exceeds the t-statistic on the random delicensing and 
labor regulation interaction 
99.1%  
    
Percentage of times that the R2 of the model with actual delicensing exceeds 
the R2 of the model with random delicensing 
96.3%  
    
Percentage of times that the actual delicensing and labor regulation 
interaction is significant at the 5% level in a specification that includes both 
actual and random licensing 
 100.0% 
    
Percentage of times that the random delicensing and labor regulation 
interaction is significant at the 5% level in a specification that includes both 
actual and random delicensing 
 11.2% 
Notes: The table reports the results of one thousand Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, every industry is allocated a random year of delicensing between 1980 and 1997, and a random 
delicensing measure is created that equals one from the random year of delicensing onwards and zero otherwise. One thousand regressions were then run using the random delicensing measures 
generated in the simulations. Column (1) compares the results from our baseline specification in Column (2) of Table 4 using the actual delicensing measure with the results of one thousand 
regressions using the same specification but replacing the level and interaction terms of actual delicensing with the level and interaction terms of random delicensing. Column (2) reports the results of 
one thousand regressions using the baseline specification from Column (2) of Table 4 but including level and interaction terms for both actual and random delicensing.  
 
 
Table 8: Robustness of the Delicensing Measure 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Log Real Output  Log Real Output  Log Real Output 
Delicense  0.040 0.019 0.020 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Labor Regulation  -0.065*  -0.066**  -0.075** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) 
Labor Regulation × Delicense  -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) 
Labor Regulation × Dummy 85   -0.017   
   (0.017)   
Labor Regulation × Dummy 91    -0.013 
     (0.015) 
Early Delicense  -0.066*     
 (0.036)     
Labor Regulation × Early Delicense  -0.021    
 (0.018)     
Observations 24374  24374  24374 
R-squared  0.88 0.88 0.88 
State-industry Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Year  Effects  YES YES YES 
Notes: The unbalanced panel includes an average of 85 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the 18-year time period from 1980 to 1997. The balanced panel concentrates on state-industries that 
are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on 
3-digit industry-state. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to generate the labor regulation measure. Dummy 85 is a dummy which is one from 1985 
onwards and zero otherwise. Dummy 91 is a dummy which is one from 1991 onwards and zero otherwise. Early delicense is a hypothetical delicensing measure which assumes that each industry is 
delicensed three years before it was actually delicensed. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 
10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 9: Selection of Industries for Delicensing and Trade Liberalization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First  Year 
Delicensed 
Tariff Reduction 
1988-97 
Delicense Tariff 
Output Growth 1980-84  -0.383  3.379     
 (1.436)  (6.134)     
Average Proportion Congress [t-4]      0.069  -6.342 
     (0.108)  (4.893) 
Average Proportion Hard Left [t-4]      0.215  -16.764 
     (0.558)  (30.170) 
Average Proportion Janata [t-4]      -0.194  1.409 
     (0.181)  (11.715) 
Average Proportion Hindu [t-4]      -0.311  -17.603 
     (0.329)  (27.880) 
Average Proportion Regional [t-4]      -0.249  10.661 
     (0.184)  (11.929) 
State-industry fixed effects NO  NO  YES  YES 
Year effects  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations 102  102  1568  1554 
R-squared 0.001  0.002  0.72  0.93 
Notes:. Columns (1) and (2) are based on cross-section regressions of the first year in which an industry is delicensed on real output growth over the 1980-84 period as a whole. Industries that are 
never delicensed are excluded from the regression. In columns (1) and (2) standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust. Columns (3) and (4) are based on an industry-time panel and standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on industry. Average Proportion Congress is the industry-employment weighted average share of seats held in state legislatures by the 
Congress parties. Average Proportion Hard Left is the industry-employment weighted average share of seats held in state legislatures by hard left parties. Average Proportion Janata is the industry-
employment weighted average share of seats held in state legislatures by the Janata parties. Average Proportion Hindu is the industry-employment weighted average share of seats held in state 
legislatures by the hindu nationalist parties. Average Proportion Regional is the industry-employment weighted average share of seats held in state legislatures by regional parties. See the data 
appendix for further details concerning the political groupings. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance 
at the 10% level. 
 
 